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Summary of Facts  
Between the 20
th
 and 21
st
 August 2012, the appellant (‘Ivey’) attended the Crockfords Club 
(‘Crockfords’) in Mayfair, London. Playing the card game ‘Punto Banco,’ he had amassed 
winnings totalling £7.7m using a tactic known, albeit not to Crockfords, as ‘edge-sorting.’ This 
tactic involves the skill of being able to identify cards through memorizing tiny differences on 
the patterns and edging of playing cards.  
Given the large value of the win, Crockfords’ practice is to conduct an ex post facto investigation 
to ensure legitimacy. If satisfied, these winnings are then electronically transferred to the 
‘winners’ bank account. Suspicions of untoward behaviour were raised after a review of the 
CCTV and audio recordings. In response, Crockfords refused to transfer the ‘winnings’ on the 
basis that Ivey had cheated. which breached an implied term of the gaming contract entered into 
by both parties that neither would cheat With the contract now void, they refunded Ivey’s total 
betting stakes, some £1m.  
Ivey maintained that, even though he could read the cards, in the sense that he had memorised 
patterns and distinct edgings of ‘high value’ cards, he had only requested some cards (of ‘low 
value’) be rotated due to superstitions and had further requested that the same deck of cards be 
used throughout (it is common that decks of cards are routinely swapped). He argued that this 
amounted to gamesmanship, not cheating. Had he physically touched the cards this would have 
amounted to cheating and led to the cards being swapped. Moreover, Ivey had sought permission 
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from the club manager to use the same cards and rotate cards in this manner to pacify his 
superstitions. Given the large stakes being made by Ivey, the Club Manager agreed to 
accommodate these requests. After Crockfords’ refusal to pay the appellant’s winnings, he 
sought to recover them via a civil process.   
At first instance, Mitting J dismissed Ivey’s claim and the Court of Appeal (CoA) further held 
that Ivey had acquired his winnings ‘through manipulation;’ this amounted to cheating and 
therefore breached the implied term of the contract. The CoA confirmed that dishonesty was not 
a necessary ingredient of cheating. If it had been a constitute ingredient, establishing dishonesty 
would be problematic, given the test laid down in R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (CA (Crim Div)). 
Ghosh outlined a two-limbed test for juries in determining dishonesty in most acquisitive 
criminal cases:  
i) was the conduct of the defendant dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest 
people (the objective limb); if yes 
ii) did the defendant himself realise that what he was doing was, by such standards, 
dishonest (the subjective limb) 
If the answer is no to either question, then dishonesty is not established. Ordinarily, the meaning 
of ‘dishonesty’ should simply be left to the jury; but where a direction is needed, the Ghosh test 
should be given. Counsel for Ivey had argued that cheating did require a dishonest state of mind. 
Counsel suggested Ivey lacked this state of mind since he was ‘genuinely convinced’ his actions 
were not dishonest, the second limb failed and he was therefore entitled to his winnings. With 
leave to appeal granted, it was for the Supreme Court to address three elements:  
1. The meaning of ‘cheating’ in the context of gambling; 
2. The relevance of dishonesty and; 
3. The proper test for dishonesty if it is essential to cheating.  
The appeal was dismissed, with the Supreme Court agreeing with the lower courts that Ivey had, 
by manipulation, cheated in winning the £7.7m withheld by Crockford’s. The court concluded 
that if cheating did require an element of dishonesty, then the test set out in Royal Brunei 
Airlines Sdn Bdd v Tan [1995] UKPC 22 should be the appropriate test, rather than that set out in 
Ghosh.  
Commentary 
Every few years, cases of enormous importance emerge from the highest levels of the English 
and Welsh appellate system, ushering in far-reaching change to established law. A recent 
example would be R v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2017] AC 387, which overturned 30 years of joint 
enterprise precedent in 2016. Ivey is another of those rare cases falling into this category, in this 
instance relating to the meaning of dishonesty in criminal cases. Whilst the facts of Ivey do not 
directly relate to dishonesty in the criminal context, the clarity, reasoning and force of the 
judgment of the Supreme Court effectively sweeps away three decades of accepted – if criticised 
– precedent, stemming from Ghosh.  
The Ghosh test has remained the prevailing authority on matters of dishonesty in criminal 
proceedings since 1982. Every law student and criminal lawyer is (or will have been at some 
point) familiar with its basic requirements. Notwithstanding its continued legal precedence 
during the last 35 years, the Ghosh Test has not enjoyed the support of commentators. There is 
not room here to fully rehearse these arguments; but much criticism has been levelled at the 
subjective limb, granting as it does the opportunity for defendants to argue that – regardless of 
the objective standard of dishonesty – they did not realise they had been dishonest by such 
standards (for a summary of the problems, see Para. 57 of the judgment). This could, for 
example, allow defendants to argue that, due to a lack of evidence about the defendant’s state of 
mind, a jury could not be satisfied that the accused had ‘realised that what he was doing was by 
[objective] standards dishonest.’ Considering the practical difficulty in proving facts as to 
someone’s state of mind, this presented a potential barrier to convictions where the defendant’s 
appreciation of ordinary standards of honesty was not obvious. Equally problematic was the 
opportunity for defendants to raise the ‘robin hood defence’ – that is, if the defendant genuinely 
believes ‘robbing the rich’ is not dishonest then they should be acquitted, regardless of what 
wider society thinks. It has therefore been argued, as Lord Hughes does explicitly in Ivey, that 
the Ghosh Test effectively meant that ‘any defendant whose subjective standards were 
sufficiently warped would be entitled to be acquitted’ (Para. 72). The test effectively favoured 
defendants whose personal standard of dishonesty diverged from that of mainstream society (an 
equally problematic concept; see below). A very unfortunate and clearly undesirable 
consequence. 
Ivey changes this. As Lord Hughes states in the judgment, the ‘second leg of the test propounded 
in Ghosh does not correctly represent the law and that directions based upon it ought no longer to 
be given’ (Para. 74). Instead, the test established in Tan and explained in Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1476 was approved at Paragraph 
62: 
‘Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by which 
the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary standards a 
defendant’s mental state would be characterised as dishonest, it is irrelevant that the 
defendant judges by different standards.’   
This objective test, as Lord Hughes asserted, represented the reasoning of ‘successive cases at 
the highest level’ (Para. 62), whereas Ghosh ‘was not compelled by authority’ due to the pre-
existing case law being ‘in a state of some entanglement’ (Para. 57). In short, Ghosh was built on 
rather shaky foundations. In critiquing the subjective limb of Ghosh, it was highlighted that a 
defendant’s genuine belief in their own honesty should not be determinative of whether they 
were in fact dishonest. Using the example of the appellant in this case, Lord Hughes said: 
‘Truthfulness is indeed one characteristic of honesty, and untruthfulness is often a 
powerful indicator of dishonesty, but a dishonest person may sometimes be truthful about 
his dishonest opinions’ (Para. 75) 
As noted above, the CoA accepted that the appellant was ‘genuinely convinced’ he had not been 
dishonest – he was truthful about his own state of mind. The Supreme Court considered this to be 
irrelevant and certainly not conclusive in determining dishonesty, since by ordinary standards he 
had been. Therefore, a person’s deeply held conviction in their own honesty cannot insulate them 
from being considered dishonest by wider society or indeed in the eyes of the law. 
Lord Hughes also noted that a divergence had emerged over the years between the meaning of 
dishonesty in civil and criminal proceedings. The court suggested there was ‘no logical or 
principled basis for the meaning of dishonesty … to differ according to whether it arises in a 
civil action or a criminal prosecution,’ branding it an ‘affront’ (Para. 63). Relying on Tan, 
Barlow Clowes, and Twinsectra Ltd. v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, the Supreme Court closed this 
gap, effectively uniting the civil and criminal tests for dishonesty under a single limb – that is, 
the purely objective test. By doing so, many of the criticisms above are addressed. 
Some final points to note. As a civil case relating to cheating in gambling, it was not necessary 
for the court to pass judgment on the Ghosh test. As such, Ivey strictly represents obiter rather 
than binding precedent when lower courts consider acquisitive criminal cases where dishonesty 
is an element of the alleged offence. That being said, this Supreme Court judgment overrules a 
long-standing CoA decision, and provides clear and unequivocal agreement between five judges, 
including the new President of the Supreme Court (Lady Hale), the former President (Lord 
Neuberger), and the former Lord Chief Justice (Lord Thomas). If any case is highly persuasive, it 
is Ivey. There can be little doubt that the ‘full’ Ghosh test has been consigned to history. 
It should also be remembered, as suggested above, that the removal of the second limb of the 
Ghosh Test does not perfect the determination of dishonesty in criminal cases. Criticism has been 
directed at the objective limb for many years. Spencer argued it was too vague and complicated 
for juries to understand, while Griew suggested there was no “ordinary standard” of honesty for 
juries to rely on; this would therefore leave jurors to simply apply their individual standards 
(which may or may not adhere to the amorphous concept of “ordinary” honesty) leading to 
inconsistency, uncertainty and expense. More recently, both Parsons and Haynes have argued 
that such vagueness potentially breaches Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the clarity and precision of criminal offences). That said, Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
acknowledged in The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) EHRR 245, that whilst legal 
certainty is desirable, it is often unattainable.   
In light of this, concerns have been raised about the weight placed on dishonesty in convicting 
defendants. The breadth afforded to the ‘appropriation’ element of theft (under Section 1 of the 
Theft Act 1968) in cases including R v Lawrence (1971) 57 Cr App R 64, DPP v Gomez [1993] 
AC 442, and R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241 has arguably created a situation where proving the 
offence hinges on proving dishonesty. As the Law Commission illustrated in a consultation paper 
on fraud: ‘[w]hen a person selects a newspaper to buy at a newsagent’s, he or she has committed 
all the elements of theft save for dishonesty’ Therefore, a test for dishonesty which is unclear and 
inconsistent represents a significant issue. 
Whilst the decision in Ivey goes some way to ameliorating this problem by abandoning the 
subjective limb, it does not overcome the potential pitfalls inherent in the objective limb. It has 
been suggested (most recently by Haynes) that a statutory definition of dishonesty could help (an 
example being Section 217 of the Crimes Act 1961 in New Zealand)  In the 27 years since 
Ghosh, Parliament has not sought to intervene; nor has the Law Commission specifically 
examined reform of theft (as it hinted it would at the turn of the century) or the plausibility of a 
statutory definition for dishonesty, beyond the negative ones currently outlined under Section 2 
of the Theft Act 1968. Dishonesty was introduced to replace a legislative definition ('fraudulently 
and without a right of claim' under the Larceny Act 1916) on the basis it would be more easily 
understood; it thus seems unlikely that statutory intervention will be coming any time soon. 
Indeed, a legislative definition presents its own difficulties - primarily, drafting in a sufficiently 
definitive manner without tying the hands of juries too tightly. As Lord Hughes suggests, 
dishonesty is ‘characterised by recognition rather than by definition’ and juries have largely 
‘coped well’ with the task of interpreting it (Para. 53) As such, we are likely – as Adam King 
suggests – to be referring to the Ivey Test for dishonesty for many years to come. 
